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I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost all of the discussion in the secondary literature concerning 
restitutionary remedies deals with, what might be labeled as, two-party cases. 
That is, the typical restitution claim arises in a situation where the claimant 
has conferred value on a defendant, which the claimant asserts it is unjust for 
the defendant to retain. Those who follow the American or Restatement1 
model for the structure of the law of restitution also would include, as part of 
this subject, two-party cases in which the defendant has become enriched by 
dealings with third parties, which constitute a breach of a duty owed to the 
claimant. A prime and simple example would be the breach of a fiduciary 
 
* F.R.S.C., University Professor and Professor Emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
Toronto. 
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (AM. LAW. INST. 2011) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD]; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION, QUASI-CONTRACTS, AND 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS (AM. LAW. INST. 1937) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT FIRST]. 
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obligation owed by the defendant to the claimant which is constituted by 
dealings with third parties which have generated a profit in the hands of the 
defendant. Though one could obviously characterize these as “three-party” 
situations, in the sense that the source of the defendant’s unjust enrichment 
is a third party, I will not do so for present purposes on the basis that these 
are situations in which the unjust retention directly results from the 
wrongdoing of the defendant who has breached a duty owed to the plaintiff. 
The present topic concerns three-party situations in a rather different 
sense. These are situations where a third party has transferred value to the 
defendant, which, for reasons of justice, ought to have been or should now 
be transferred to the plaintiff. As we shall see, such cases may or may not 
involve wrongful conduct by the third party. Where the value has been 
transferred to the defendant, however, the plaintiff might be said to have a 
better claim to the enrichment than does the defendant. These types of cases 
are much less discussed in the literature and, I suspect, much less familiar to 
the profession at large. Nonetheless, there are, both historically and in 
contemporary circumstances, many cases of this kind and their proper 
resolution as a matter of some interest. 
This paper will examine the traditional English position concerning such 
claims and contrast that doctrine with more recent developments in American 
and Canadian restitutionary doctrine. The principal point of comparison is 
that American and Canadian doctrine allows restitutionary relief in a much 
broader range of three-party cases. With particular reference to Canadian 
doctrine, it is of interest that there appear to be a substantial number of 
Canadian cases providing relief in situations quite similar to those found in 
American law. This appears to be the case notwithstanding the fact that there 
is no obvious evidence of American influence in the sense of reliance on 
American authorities in the development of Canadian law in three-party 
cases. 
A complication found in Canadian law finds no parallel in American 
doctrine and, for a time at least, threatened to preclude a recovery in at least 
some three-party cases. Nonetheless, a recent Supreme Court of Canada 
decision, Moore v. Sweet,2 to be further considered below, has flatly rejected 
this possibility, and it now appears that Canadian and American doctrine run 
along quite similar lines. This might be considered to be some evidence in 
support of the proposition that there is merit in the position taken in the 
American and Canadian cases which, in turn, might provide a basis for 
reconsideration of some aspects of English doctrine. 
The paradigm two-party case, for pedagogical purposes at least, is the 
simple case of a mistaken payment. The claimant has paid money to the 
defendant as a result of a mistake of some kind. For centuries, the common 
 
2 Moore v. Sweet, [2018] S.C.R. 52 (Can.).  
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law has allowed recovery subject, at least in more recent years in English and 
Canadian experience, to the ability of the defendant to raise a change of 
position defense. It may well be that the paradigm case for a practitioner, in 
the sense that it is the type of case more frequently encountered, is the transfer 
of value under an agreement which is unenforceable for some reason. In such 
cases, benefits conferred through contractual performance are usually, 
though not invariably, recoverable. The simple mistaken payment claim, 
however, has the appeal of simplicity for analytical purposes. To consider the 
prospect of a three-party claim in the context of a mistaken payment, one may 
imagine that the mistake in question has the effect of inducing the payer to 
make the payment to the wrong party. The question to be considered here, 
then, is whether the party who should have received the payment is entitled 
to bring a restitution claim against the party who actually did receive the 
payment. We may note in passing that, in the making of the payment, neither 
the third party, the mistaken payer, nor the recipient defendant have engaged 
in the breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff, the intended recipient. It is well 
established, of course, that the mistaken payer has a claim against the 
recipient. It is much less clear in English and Canadian law whether the 
intended recipient has such a claim. 
II. THE TRADITIONAL ENGLISH POSITION 
The unifying theme of traditional English law on restitutionary remedies 
in three-party situations is that relief is typically available only where the 
third party has obtained a benefit from the claimant through wrongful 
conduct of some kind and has then passed it on to the defendant. Such claims 
have been recognized both at common law and in equity, and the following 
brief synopsis3 will therefore distinguish between common law and equitable 
claims. 
At common law, relief is typically afforded in circumstances where a 
third party has misappropriated funds from the claimant and has, in some 
fashion, passed it on to the third party. In some cases, the misappropriation 
may amount to theft. In others, it may constitute a breach of contract or the 
tort of conversion. Where the miscreant is an employee of the claimant, the 
misappropriation may amount to a wrong of all three kinds. A leading 
eighteenth century authority may come within this category. In Clarke v. 
Shee & Johnson,4 the plaintiff brewer had an employee, his clerk, who had 
diverted sums intended for the employer that had come into his possession in 
the ordinary course of business. The employee then paid the misappropriated 
 
3 For more extensive treatment, see ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 19 (3d ed. 
Oxford University Press 2011); P.D. MADDAUGH & J.D. MCCAMUS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION ch. 36 
(looseleaf ed. 2019). 
4 Clarke v. Shee & Johnson (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1041. 
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funds to the defendant in return for lottery tickets. The latter transaction was 
unlawful under the legislation then applicable to lotteries. Lord Mansfield, 
with three concurrences, allowed a “money had and received” claim by the 
employer against the supplier of the lottery tickets on the basis that the 
common law claim in money had and received, rather like a bill in equity, 
would lie where it was against “conscience” that the defendant retained the 
sums in question.5 It was significant that the transaction between the 
employee and the defendant was unlawful as otherwise, the Court observed, 
the defendant would be able to raise a bona fide purchaser defense. Lord 
Mansfield did observe that the claimant was the “true owner” of the funds.6 
Accordingly, it has long been assumed that such claims would lie only where 
a proprietary link could be established between the claimant and the funds 
transferred to the defendant. The recovery, it should be noted, is nonetheless 
personal in nature rather than proprietary. 
The concern to establish a proprietary connection concerning the 
transferred assets is also evident in the leading modern English authority, 
Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd.7 Again, the claim concerned funds 
misappropriated by the third party. In this case, the third party was a partner, 
a Mr. Cass, in the plaintiff firm of solicitors who misappropriated partnership 
funds and spent the money (and lost most of it) gambling at a facility operated 
by the defendant in London, known as the “Playboy Club.” The firm sought 
restitution of the funds gambled away by Cass from the Club. The principal 
significance of this decision for this area of the law is that it was the occasion 
on which the House of Lords first plainly recognized the existence of a 
change of position defense. In granting relief, based on the Clarke v. Shee & 
Johnson line of authority, the Court satisfied itself that the transactions at the 
Playboy Club were unenforceable, thus depriving the defendant of a bona 
fide purchaser defense. As Cass’s gambling activity was not completely 
unsuccessful, he had enjoyed some winnings. The House of Lords applied a 
change of position defense in the defendant’s favour with respect to the 
monies it had paid out to Mr. Cass.8  
Establishing a proprietary link between the funds misappropriated from 
the firm by Cass and the monies paid to the Playboy Club and, further, by the 
firm to the monies still remaining in the hands of the Playboy Club would 
have been a challenging exercise. Nonetheless, the House of Lords appeared 
to assume that it was necessary to establish that the firm retained title to the 
funds advanced by Cass to the Playboy Club. Cass had also spent some of his 
own resources in gambling at the Playboy Club. Whether or not a mixing had 
 
5 Id. at 1041–42.  
6 Id. at 1042. 
7 See Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] A.C. 548 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
8 Id. at 579. 
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occurred was apparently unclear but, if it had occurred, it would have 
complicated a tracing exercise. The matter was satisfactorily resolved, 
however, by the defendant’s concession that the plaintiff retained title to the 
monies advanced to the club by Cass. To the extent it might have been 
necessary to demonstrate that the club had retained or been enriched by the 
firm’s monies, a number of complications could have arisen. Apart from the 
question of Cass mixing the firm’s monies with his own, it was the Club’s 
practice to issue chits in return for monies advanced by customers and then 
to cash out whatever chits remained in the hands of gamblers at the end of 
their gambling sessions. Further, it was apparently the practice of Cass to 
spend his winnings in further gambling at the Club. Again, these difficulties 
were resolved by a concession made by the Club that a specific amount of 
money, in their view, constituted the surplus retained by the Club after 
making appropriate deductions to account for these complexities.9 With these 
matters resolved, Lord Goff was able to conclude that the Clarke precedent 
was controlling and that the firm was entitled to recover the amount in 
question from the defendant Club. Lord Goff observed that the club “cannot 
in conscience retain the money—or, as we say nowadays, for the third party 
to retain the money would result in his unjust enrichment at the expense of 
the owner of the money.”10 
In summary, then, the common law doctrine allows the recovery of 
monies misappropriated from a claimant by a third party who then passes on 
the funds in question to the eventual defendant, provided that the defendant 
cannot raise a defense of bona fide purchase or of change of position. It 
remains contentious in English law, however, whether such recovery is 
limited to situations in which a claimant can establish a proprietary 
connection to the funds eventually transferred to the defendant by the third 
party. Another possible view is that this would be merely one way of 
establishing that the benefit acquired by the defendant had been “at the 
expense” of the claimant but that it might not necessarily be the only way of 
doing so. Thus, for example, on the Lipkin Gorman facts, it might have been 
possible to establish that, but for the misappropriation, Cass could not have 
afforded to gamble as enthusiastically as he did at the Club. Indeed, it may 
be that an assumption of this kind provided a basis for the Club’s concession 
on the matter. 
On the equity side, the principal vehicle for imposing liability on remote 
recipients of wrongfully acquired benefits is the law of fiduciary obligation. 
The two doctrines achieving this objective are usually referred to as 
“knowing assistance” and “knowing receipt.” Of the two, it is the latter that 
is particularly of present interest. The doctrine of “knowing assistance” 
 
9 Id. at 569. 
10 Id. at 572. 
70 FIU Law Review [Vol. 14:065 
imposes liability on third parties who have, in some fashion, participated in 
a breach of fiduciary obligation either by facilitating the misconduct or by 
inducing it. Essentially, then, it is a form of accessory liability and is not, in 
fact, dependent on establishing that the defendant received any trust assets as 
a result of his conduct. The doctrine of “knowing receipt,” on the other hand, 
is applicable to a defendant who is the recipient of trust assets 
misappropriated by the third party by means of a breach of fiduciary 
obligation. The remedy in “knowing receipt” cases then is plainly 
restitutionary in nature. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a modern 
leading case, held that the doctrine of “knowing receipt” is to be included 
within the law of unjust enrichment.11 
By way of distinguishing the two different forms of liability, it might be 
said that the doctrine of “knowing assistance” is “fault-based”; whereas, the 
doctrine of “knowing receipt” might be said to be “receipt-based.” On the 
other hand, both doctrines might be considered to involve an element of fault 
inasmuch as, in each case, it must be established that there is some form of 
knowledge or awareness on the part of the defendant that a fiduciary breach 
has occurred. To establish a claim of “knowing assistance,” the plaintiff must 
establish that the plaintiff had “actual knowledge” of the circumstances 
giving rise to the breach of fiduciary obligation. In a “knowing receipt” case, 
however, the knowledge required is of a lesser standard. It is said that in a 
case of “knowing receipt,” the defendant must have had constructive 
knowledge of the breach of fiduciary obligation, that is “knowledge of 
circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest person, or 
knowledge of facts which would put an honest person on inquiry.”12 
In a knowing receipt claim, then, the plaintiff must establish 
constructive knowledge on the part of the defendant recipient. Further, the 
plaintiff must establish that the benefit transferred to the defendant 
constituted an asset of the claimant.13 That is to say, it is plainly established 
that in this context a proprietary link between the claimant’s asset and the 
asset received by the recipient is a necessary pre-requisite to recovery. 
Further, it must be established that the recipient acquired the claimant’s asset 
for the recipient’s personal use. Thus, it would not be sufficient for the 
recipient to have received the asset as an agent for another party. 
The need for a proprietary link in “knowing receipt” cases provides an 
explanation for the fact that the normal remedy made available in such cases 
is that of constructive trust. In this respect, the equitable doctrine differs from 
the doctrine at common law. At common law, as we have noted, the remedy 
 
11 Citadel Gen. Assurance Co. v. Lloyds Bank Can., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 805 (Can.). 
12 Air Can. v. M & L Travel Ltd., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 787, 812 (Can.); see Citadel Gen. Assurance, 3 
S.C.R. at para. 22. 
13 MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, The Elements of “Knowing Receipt”, in THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, 
supra note 3, at cmt. 36, heading 36:300.20. 
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is personal in nature even though, albeit with some contention, recovery at 
common law rests on establishing a proprietary connection between the 
plaintiff and the assets transferred ultimately to the defendant. 
In summary, then, both at common law and in equity, restitution is 
allowed in three-party cases where the claimant’s assets have been 
misappropriated by a third party and then passed on by the third party to the 
defendant. The common law cases deal essentially with cases of breach of 
contract, theft, and tortious misconduct by the third party. The equity cases 
deal principally with breach of fiduciary obligation. We should notice that 
both of these doctrines are of no assistance in our paradigm case of a mistaken 
payment. Where monies have been mistakenly paid by A to B when, in fact, 
A actually intended to pay the monies to C, B has not engaged in wrongful 
conduct resulting in the receipt of the mistakenly paid monies. Thus, there is 
no basis for a restitutionary three-party claim by C against B under these 
common law and equity doctrines. Oddly, however, there is one lonely 
instance in which C can recover from B monies mistakenly paid by A to B 
and that is in the context of estates administration. In the famous case of Re 
Diplock,14 the executors of the rather large estate of one Caleb Diplock, 
mistakenly interpreted the will and distributed large amounts of money to as 
many as 139 different charities, including numerous hospitals and schools. 
An action brought by the next of kin, who were the proper recipients of the 
monies in question, against the charities, enjoyed success. In other words, in 
a case where the executors mistakenly paid monies to a group of defendants, 
the intended recipients of the monies were granted a direct claim against the 
improper recipients. Thus far, however, English law has not generalized the 
proposition evidently applied in Diplock and recognized that there exists a 
general rule that in a mistaken payment case, the intended recipient of the 
monies paid can bring a restitution claim against the unintended recipient. 
In the English law of restitution relating to third party cases, then, there 
remain some interesting points of difficulty. First, both at common law and 
in equity, it may be asked whether it is appropriate, as a matter of principle, 
to require a proprietary link between the claimant and the assets received by 
the defendant. That is, should it be necessary to show that the claimant is the 
owner of the assets so received whether at common law or in equity. Second, 
it may be asked whether the rule in Re Diplock ought to be extended to 
mistaken payment cases more generally. Third, the requirement of 
constructive notice in “knowing receipt” cases remains contentious. With 
respect to the latter point, there is now an extended debate in the academic 
literature as to whether constructive notice ought to be required in such cases. 
We may note that there is no such requirement in common law three-party 
 
14 Diplock v. Wintle (Re Diplock), [1950] 2 All ER 1137 (Can. H.L.), aff’d sub nom. Ministry of 
Health v. Simpson [1951] AC 251 (HL). 
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cases. Thus, there is no requirement in a case like Clarke v. Shee and 
Johnson15 that the supplier of the lottery tickets was aware that the monies 
used to pay for them were misappropriated by the brewer’s clerk. Those who 
favour “strict” liability as a general matter, including in “knowing receipt” 
cases, make the argument that the legitimate interests of the recipient in three-
party cases are adequately protected by the bona fide purchaser and change 
of position defenses. These defenses are, of course, recognized at common 
law and may be thought to provide a principled basis for imposing strict 
liability in that context. If one asks what the legitimate interests of the 
recipient of monies might be in such cases, they would appear to be precisely 
analogous to the interests of a recipient of mistakenly paid monies. If the 
recipient had received the monies under a valid transaction, there is obviously 
an interest in protecting the sanctity or integrity of such transactions. This 
interest of the defendant is adequately protected, however, by the bona fide 
purchaser defense. Further, the recipient who lacks knowledge of the problem 
relating to the initial acquisition of the funds has an interest in not suffering 
as a result of detrimental reliance on the receipt of the monies. This interest, 
of course, is adequately protected by the change of position defense. There 
does not appear to be a need for any additional protection to the interests of 
recipients in the context of knowing receipt. Accordingly, it is argued, the 
strict liability applicable in common law should be extended into the equity 
context, provided that both the bone fide purchase and change of position 
defenses are recognized as being available in the equity context.16 Such 
arguments, however, have not yet had an influence on the English law of 
knowing receipt. 
III. EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF SUCH RELIEF: AMERICAN AND 
CANADIAN CASES 
For purposes of concision, I will simply assume, without further 
documentation, that remedies that would be available in three-party cases 
covered by traditional English doctrine are also available in both American 
and Canadian law. Of greater interest, however, are situations in which 
recovery would be available in Canadian17 and American18 jurisprudence 
where there appears to be no parallel in English law. A brief sketch of such 
cases will be provided here.  
 
15 Clarke v. Shee & Johnson (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1041. 
16 See, e.g., Peter Birks, Misdirected Funds: Restitution from the Recipient, LLOYD’S MAR. & 
COM. L.Q. 296 (1989); Lord Nicholls, Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark, in RESTITUTION: 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 231 (W.R. Cornish et al. eds., Oxford, Hart Pub., 1998); cf. Rohan Havelock, 
The Transformation of Knowing Receipt, 22 REST. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
17 See MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 3, cmt. 35. 
18 For more extensive treatment, see RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 1, at vol. 2, ch. 6. 
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The Restatement Third brings together comprehensively, perhaps for the 
first time, three-party cases of the kind under consideration here. Section 48 
articulates a general principle underlying these cases in the following form: 
“Payment to Defendant to Which Claimant Has a Better 
Right.”  
If a third person makes a payment to the defendant in which 
(as between claimant and defendant) the claimant has a 
better legal or equitable right, the claimant is entitled in 
restitution from the defendant as necessary to prevent unjust 
enrichment.  
The cases gathered together as illustrations of this principle or rule may 
be conveniently subdivided into a number of headings, many of which may 
overlap to some extent. A brief synopsis with American and Canadian 
illustrations follows. 
A. Claimant Has Borne an Expense for Which the Defendant Has 
Been Reimbursed 
A typical example falling within this category arises in circumstances 
where tax payments are reimbursed for some reason by the taxing authority, 
but are not reimbursed to the party who had actually paid or borne the burden 
of the tax in the first place. A simple illustration based on American 
authority19 involves the collection and reimbursement of federal taxes on 
products provided to consumers. The supplier charges the applicable tax to 
the customer and remits it to the federal authority. Subsequent litigation 
involving other taxpayers results in a decision that the particular product is 
not properly considered to be subject to the tax. The federal authority then 
remits tax payments to payers, including the particular supplier. The 
customer, who had actually borne the burden of the tax, is able to seek 
restitution of the taxes reimbursed from the supplier. A similar Canadian 
case20 involved the payment of taxes on building materials by a general 
contractor, as was required by the building contract. The employer of the 
contractor was a university. When subsequent federal legislation reimbursed 
universities with respect to taxes paid on building materials, the general 
contractor successfully brought a restitution claim against the university for 
the taxes paid by the contractor and subsequently reimbursed to the 
university. 
 
19 See Wayne Cty. Produce Co. v. Duffy-Mott Co., 155 N.E. 669 (N.Y. 1927). 
20 See James More & Sons Ltd. v. Univ. of Ottawa (1975), 5 O.R. 2d 162 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.). 
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Another Canadian authority21 indicates that this proposition extends 
beyond the context of tax reimbursements. A supplier of parts to the 
manufacturer of equipment to be supplied by the manufacturer to a third party 
had completed work in progress by the time the contract between the 
manufacturer and the third party unexpectedly terminated. Under that 
agreement, the manufacturer was entitled to compensation for work in 
progress. The manufacturer claimed, as part of the work in progress, the work 
performed by the parts supplier. The parts supplier successfully sought 
restitution of the amounts reimbursed to the manufacturer that related to the 
otherwise uncompensated work in progress of the parts supplier. 
B. Defendant Intercepts Benefits Pertaining to Proprietary or Other 
Entitlements of the Claimant 
Historically, there are a number of lines of authority, including English 
authority, dealing with situations where the defendant has acquired a benefit, 
typically money, that pertains in some sense to ownership rights or other 
forms of entitlement of the claimant. A simple illustration relates to 
misdirected rental payments.22 Thus, if A mistakenly pays rent to B, thinking 
that B is the owner of the property, whereas, in fact, C is the owner of the 
property, C has a good restitutionary claim against B for the monies received. 
Similar issues may arise in the context of co-ownership of land and, again, 
lines of authority allowing recovery are found in all jurisdictions.23 Other 
venerable lines of authority relate to claims of office holders who are entitled 
to certain fees or profits in cases where such monies are collected by usurpers 
of those offices. Similarly, in the context of estates administration, one who 
purports to collect monies owing to deceased on behalf of the estate must 
account for the monies received to the duly appointed representatives of the 
estate.24 
Cases that are not covered by the traditional authorities often arise in the 
context of transfers of ownership. In a Canadian case,25 an owner of real 
property contested a municipal tax assessment. Before that application was 
resolved, however, the owner sold the property to the defendant. After the 
closing of the transaction, it was decided by the appropriate authority that a 
 
21 See Stevested Mach. & Eng’g Ltd. v. Metso Paper Ltd. (2014), 372 D.L.R. 4th 112 (Can. B.C. 
C.A.). 
22 Arris v. Stukeley (1677) 86 Eng. Rep. 1060 (KB). 
23 See MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 3, at heading 35:500 “Defendant Intercepts Benefits 
Pertaining to Proprietary or Other Entitlements of the Claimant”; RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 1, at 
vol. 2, 129–44. 
24 See MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 3, at heading 35:500 “Defendant Intercepts Benefits 
Pertaining to Proprietary or Other Entitlements of the Claimant.” 
25 80 Mornelle Props. Inc. v. Malla Props. Ltd. (2010), 327 D.L.R. 4th 361 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
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tax refund was payable. Under the applicable legislation, the refund was 
payable to the registered owner of the land. That person was, of course, the 
purchaser. The former owner successfully sought restitution of the refund 
from the purchaser. Similarly, a vendor who, after closing, receives benefits 
accruing to the owner of the property would be liable to account for such 
receipts to the new owner and American authority so holds.26 
C. Recovery by the Intended Recipient of Money Mistakenly Paid to a 
Third Party 
As we have seen, English law allows recovery by the intended recipient 
of monies mistakenly paid to a third party where, in the context of estates 
administration, the executors have mistakenly paid the wrong party. In such 
circumstances, the intended beneficiary is entitled to recover from the 
recipient. English law does not, however, recognize a more general 
proposition of this kind relating to mistaken payments. American law, on the 
other hand, has granted relief in such cases well beyond the context of estates 
administration. Indeed, a rule to this effect was stated in the original 1937 
Restatement in section 126.27 The authorities relied upon, as support for the 
Restatement section, deal with situations where the mistaken assumption, if 
true, would render the plaintiff liable to make the payment in question. Thus, 
the payer, thinking that he is obligated to pay A, whereas he is in fact liable 
to pay B, pays A by mistake. In such circumstances, B is entitled to recover 
from A the mistaken payment. A great variety of authorities are cited in 
support of this section. They deal, for example, with cases in which a 
judgment debtor on a claim which is subject to an attorney’s lien pays the 
judgment creditor. In such a case, the creditor is directly liable to the 
attorney.28 In another case, the maker of a note mistakenly paid the defendant 
instead of the holder.29 The holder has a direct claim against the recipient. A 
payment is mistakenly made to the mortgagor rather than the mortgagee, and 
so on.30 There do not appear to be Canadian authorities to the same effect. 
D. Failed Arrangements to Allocate Assets Following Family 
Dissolution 
There are numerous Canadian and American authorities dealing with 
situations in which a married or co-habiting couple make arrangements upon 
 
26 King Cty. v. Odman, 111 P.2d 228, 230 (Wash. 1941). 
27 RESTATEMENT FIRST, supra note 1, at § 126. 
28 Sibley v. Cty. of Pine, 17 N.W. 337, 338 (Minn. 1883). 
29 Ind. Nat’l Bank v. Holtsclaw, 98 Ind. 85, 88 (1884).  
30 Palo v. Rogers, 165 A. 803, 805 (Conn. 1933). 
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the dissolution of their relationship with respect to the allocation of particular 
assets—typically insurance or pension benefits—which are then not properly 
implemented. Thus, it might be agreed that upon dissolution of their 
relationship, the initial spouse or partner will remain entitled to life insurance 
benefits. In breach of those arrangements, the insured might designate a new 
person, typically a new co-habitant, to be the beneficiary of the policy. Upon 
the death of the insured, the proceeds become payable to the new partner. 
The former spouse or partner seeks restitution of the proceeds from the 
recipient. In other cases, the failed implementation might result from a 
mistake of some kind on the part of the insured or the pensioner. Thus, the 
insured might have ineffectively attempted to carry out an undertaking or an 
intention to transfer the insurance benefits to a new partner. As a result of the 
failed attempt at implementation, the benefits are payable to the former 
spouse. The former category of case might be characterized as an intentional 
breach of an undertaking. The latter category will often be a mistake case in 
the sense that the failed implementation will be accidental rather than 
intentional. 
There is well established American31 and Canadian authority allowing 
relief in the breach of undertaking context. The recent and now leading 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore v. Sweet32 is a case of this 
kind. The plaintiff Michelle Moore was married to Lawrence Moore for more 
than 20 years. They had three children. In the course of the marriage, in light 
of Lawrence’s unstable employment history and other personal problems, the 
parties agreed that Lawrence should take out a life insurance policy naming 
Michelle as beneficiary in order to provide some financial security to 
Michelle in the event of his passing. Such a policy was taken out by 
Lawrence. Upon the dissolution of their relationship, Lawrence agreed to 
maintain Michelle as the beneficiary of the policy and Michelle, in return, 
undertook to pay the premiums. Michelle did so only to discover, upon 
Lawrence’s passing, that he had breached his undertaking and named his new 
co-habitant, Risa Sweet, as the “irrevocable beneficiary” of the policy. The 
Supreme Court of Canada, reversing the judgment below of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal, granted Michelle’s claim against Risa Sweet for the proceeds of 
the policy. There are several American authorities to the same effect.33 
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore v. Sweet, 
the leading Canadian authority on point dealt with the second type of 
situation identified above, that is, a mistaken failure to implement an 
intention to change the beneficiary of a life insurance policy. In Roberts v. 
 
31 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 1, at § 48, illus. 22–26. 
32 Moore v. Sweet (2018), 430 D.L.R. 4th 315 (Can. S.C.C.). 
33 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 1, at § 48, illus. 22. 
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Martindale,34 the contest was between the former spouse of the deceased and 
the deceased’s sister. Upon the dissolution of the marriage, the parties had 
agreed that the husband would relinquish any interest in the estate of his wife. 
The couple had separated after a lengthy marriage after the deceased became 
ill. The sister of the deceased cared for her during her illness, and it was the 
intention of the deceased to confer the benefits of a group life insurance 
policy upon her. Not only was this her intention, but she thought she had 
undertaken the necessary steps to achieve this objective. In this she was 
mistaken, and the benefits remained payable to her husband. Nonetheless, the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal held that the sister was entitled to impose a 
constructive trust on the benefits inasmuch as “justice and good 
conscience”35 so required. In the Court’s view, it was of some significance 
that the husband had surrendered any rights he might have to the property of 
the deceased. The problem arises, then, not from a breach of undertaking by 
the former spouse but, rather, from a failure by the deceased to successfully 
implement her intention to transfer value to her sister. When considered as a 
mistaken transfer of value, the Richardson case appears to be quite analogous 
to the mistaken payment problem. 
In summary, then, there are a number of Canadian and American 
authorities providing for restitutionary relief in the context of three-party 
situations which do not appear to be covered by traditional English doctrine. 
Generalizations about such cases are not easily articulated. Perhaps one can 
do no better than the generalization offered in section 48 of Restatement 
Third to the effect that a benefit has been conferred upon the defendant by a 
third party in circumstances where “(as between claimant and defendant) the 
claimant has a better legal or equitable right to the payment in question.”36 
For present purposes, however, two important points may be noted. First, it 
is very often the case that there is no proprietary right to the money or other 
benefits transferred in the claimant to the money or other benefits transferred 
to the defendant. Thus, the claim to reimbursements paid to defendants in 
circumstances where the claimant initially bore the expense arises not from 
a proprietary right but rather from a moral obligation. Second, it is typically 
the case that the defendant has no knowledge, actual or constructive, of the 
circumstances giving rise to the nature of the plaintiff’s claim. Thus, there is 
no suggestion in Moore v. Sweet, for example, that Ms. Sweet was aware of 
the arrangements Lawrence had made with his former wife. 
 
34 Roberts v. Martindale (1998), 162 D.L.R. 4th 475 (Can. B.C. C.A.). 
35 Id. at para. 24. 
36 RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 1, at vol. 2, § 47. Section 47 deals with claims to recover 
payments made to the defendant with respect to claimant’s property. Id. This is said to be an illustration 
of the broader principle set out in Section 48. See id. at cmt. a. 
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IV. THREE-PARTY CASES AND THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
PRINCIPLE 
The unjust enrichment principle, as articulated in Restatement First, 
holds that “[a] person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of 
another is required to make restitution to the other.”37 There is a risk, in 
Canadian and English jurisprudence at least, that literal or rigid interpretation 
and application of that principle will create unnecessary difficulties in three-
party cases. A literal interpretation and application of the element of “at the 
expense of,” would exclude some three-party cases from coverage by the 
principle. Thus, in Moore v. Sweet,38 for example, the monies were paid to 
Risa Sweet by the insurer and not by the claimant Michelle Moore. If “at the 
expense of” is interpreted narrowly or literally as meaning at the “out-of-
pocket” expense of the plaintiff, this element is not present on these facts. 
Similarly, in the tax reimbursement cases, it might be argued that the 
reimbursement is “at the expense of” the taxing authority rather than the 
plaintiff. This is clearly not a problem or potential problem in American law. 
It is obvious from the contents of the Restatement First, that the unjust 
enrichment principle was not being interpreted so literally and further that it 
was not the case that its authors were of the view that all of the lines of 
authority collected in Restatement First could be explained on the basis of 
the unjust enrichment principle if it were to be narrowly construed in this 
fashion. Thus, the Restatement First includes all of the law of fiduciary 
obligation even though, in some cases at least, profits or benefits acquired 
through breach of fiduciary duty may not be at the expense of the plaintiff in 
this narrow sense.39 Obviously, the terms “restitution” and “unjust 
enrichment” were being used somewhat loosely by the Restatement’s authors 
to capture all cases of benefits unjustly retained by a defendant (whether or 
not they were directly acquired from the pocket of the plaintiff). 
The risk that narrow interpretation of “at the expense of” the plaintiff 
might cause difficulty in three-party cases is largely attributable to the work 
of the late Professor Peter Birks. Although Birks’ views on these definitional 
issues evolved over time, in the latest version of his views—written, some 
would say, in his “more dogmatic and less compelling”40 phase—Birks 
pronounced that “unjust enrichment” could only be properly understood if 
“at the expense of” was narrowly and literally interpreted to refer only to 
cases where value had been transferred from the plaintiff to the defendant.41 
 
37 RESTATEMENT FIRST, supra note 1, at vol. 1, § 1 (emphasis added). 
38 Moore v. Sweet (2018), 430 D.L.R. 4th 315 (Can. S.C.C.). 
39 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT FIRST, supra note 1, at § 197, cmt. c (“Where no harm to beneficiary”). 
40 Gerard McMeel, What Kind of Jurist Was Peter Birks?, 19 RESTITUTION L. REV. 15, 28 (2011). 
41 Peter Birks, Misnomer, in RESTITUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (William Cornish et al. 
eds., Hart Pub., 1998). 
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Indeed, it was his view that the loose usage of the concept had essentially 
“wrecked”42 the project of Seavey and Scott in writing the Restatement First 
of “Restitution.” They had incorrectly included both cases of direct transfer 
together with cases of what Birks would refer to as “restitution for wrongs” 
which, as in the case of fiduciary obligation, include both direct transfers and 
cases where the defendant has acquired benefits from third parties. Thus, for 
Birks, the subject-matter of Restatement First can only be properly 
understood if it is subdivided into a number of new branches of the law. The 
first would be true “unjust enrichment,” and the second would be “restitution 
for wrongs.” As, in his view, not all of the restitution cases were embraced 
by these two new branches of the law, there needed to be a third—tentatively 
titled “Miscellaneous”—under which the left-overs would be gathered 
together.43 It is not necessary to explore these eccentric views further for 
present purposes. The critical point is that there is an element of English 
thinking and writing about unjust enrichment that treats the concept rather 
narrowly as applicable only to cases involving direct transfers from plaintiff 
to defendant and, as Canadian experience demonstrates, such thinking could 
create difficulties in the analysis of three-party cases. 
Canadian experience on this point is complicated by the fact that in a 
leading case,44 and for reasons that remain unclear, Judge Dickson, a future 
Chief Justice of Canada, articulated the unjust enrichment principle 
idiosyncratically as involving three elements—a benefit to the defendant, a 
“corresponding deprivation” to the plaintiff, and “no juristic reason” for the 
transfer.45 We will return below to the “no juristic reason” element. With 
respect to the “at the expense of” element, however, we note that Judge 
Dickson substituted the concept of “corresponding deprivation” of the 
plaintiff. This re-working of “at the expense of” appears to call for a narrow 
or literal restriction of recovery to cases where benefits have been transferred 
directly from plaintiffs to defendants. As suggested above, such a restriction 
could pose problems in three-party cases and such problems have, indeed, 
surfaced in the Canadian jurisprudence. 
Thus, in Moore v. Sweet46 itself, the defendant argued that the benefits 
were conferred upon the defendant Sweet, not by the plaintiff Michelle 
Moore but by the insurer. Hence, there was no “corresponding deprivation” 
 
42 Peter Birks, A Letter to America: A New Restatement of Restitution, 3 GLOBAL JURIST 
FRONTIERS 2 (2003). 
43 PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 22 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2005) (mentioning only 
negotiorum gestio and maritime salvage as possible components of this new branch of the law but 
declining to enumerate further “since to enumerate all of its members requires encyclopedic erudition”). 
Unsurprisingly, a treatise on “miscellaneous” has not yet materialized. 
44 Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834 (Can.). 
45 Id. at 848. 
46 Moore v. Sweet (2018), 430 D.L.R. 4th 315 (Can. S.C.C.). 
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to the plaintiff. An argument to this effect appeared to enjoy some success 
below in the Ontario Court of Appeal.47 Fortunately, the Supreme Court of 
Canada reversed and took a broader view of the concept of “corresponding 
deprivation.” In the Court’s view, it was sufficient to establish a 
“corresponding deprivation” that the benefits that had accrued to the 
defendant would or should otherwise have accrued to the plaintiff. This was 
obviously the case in Moore v. Sweet, and the corresponding deprivation test 
was met. Were it not for the third party’s breach of undertaking, Michelle 
would have received the proceeds. Her “deprivation” was the failure to 
receive them. A similar analysis should apply, presumably, to a court 
interpreting the traditional wording of the “at the expense of” elements. 
Turning to the Canadian “no juristic reason” test, this element may also 
create difficulty in three-party cases. Parenthetically, we may note that the 
source of this element remains quite obscure. It is not found in the law of 
other jurisdictions or in the academic literature. It obviously is designed to 
replace the “unjust” element in the unjust enrichment principle. It seems 
possible—indeed I think it is likely—that Judge Dickson was attempting to 
assure his colleagues, whose scepticism about unjust enrichment was 
evident,48 that he was not simply invoking abstract notions of “justice” or 
“injustice” but was, rather, relying on a more precise or at least more lawyerly 
principle of absence of “juristic reason.” The problem, of course, is that 
“absence of juristic reason” is not a particularly precise or helpful notion. It 
obviously embraces the well-known concepts that benefits transferred as a 
gift or under a binding agreement or because the transfer is required by law 
are not recoverable. It must be said, however, that this is a rather obscure way 
of referring to them. But, beyond these well-known categories of “juristic 
reason” for a transfer, it is not at all clear what the concept means. In the 
three-party context, there is a risk that where the third party was directed by 
a statute or agreement to pay the defendant, relief might be denied on the 
basis that the agreement or statute provided a “juristic reason” for the transfer. 
Thus, in the tax reimbursement cases, the statute typically commands that the 
defendant be paid. The problem is that the plaintiff bore the initial burden of 
paying the tax. In the cohabitation/insurance cases, the insurance contract, 
perhaps reinforced by statute, requires that the insurer pay the proceeds to the 
defendant. This problem did in fact arise in Moore v. Sweet. The governing 
statute clearly indicated that the insurer should pay the “irrevocable 
beneficiary,” Ms. Sweet. Arguably the statute constituted a “juristic reason” 
for the transfer and recovery should, therefore, be denied. This type of 
argument had succeeded in earlier Canadian jurisprudence49 and in the Court 
 
47 See id. at paras. 70–75 (though the claim was rejected on other grounds). 
48 Pettkus, 2 S.C.R. at 836 (Martland, J., dissenting) (“palm tree justice”). 
49 See, e.g., Wilson v. Wysosk (2014), 98 E.T.R. 3d 298 (Can. B.C. S.C.). 
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of Appeal below.50 Fortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected this 
argument in Moore and held that such statutory arrangements would preclude 
relief only in circumstances where the statute plainly indicated that it not only 
required the payment to the defendant but clearly and unambiguously 
excluded restitutionary relief to a person in the position of Michelle Moore. 
In short, the existence of an explanation for the fact that the monies were paid 
to the defendant does not necessarily create a “juristic reason” for the transfer 
that precludes restitutionary relief. A similar analysis would apply, 
presumably, to the tax reimbursement cases. In short, for Canadian purposes, 
Moore v. Sweet appears to have solved the “juristic reason” problem in three-
party cases, enabling Canadian courts to achieve results similar to those 
found in American jurisprudence. 
V. LESSONS FOR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE FROM AMERICAN 
AND CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 
If one accepts the attractiveness of the results in Canadian and American 
three-party restitution cases briefly canvassed above, it might be suggested 
that there are a few lessons that could be carried into modification of the 
traditional English position in cases of this kind. 
First, these cases might be considered to lend support for the proposition 
that liability in English three-party cases should generally be considered to 
be strict. That is to say, there does not appear to be a convincing basis for 
precluding liability in cases where the recipient is completely unaware of the 
circumstances giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim, provided that the legitimate 
interests of an innocent recipient are protected by the defenses of bona fide 
purchase and change of position. Arguably, then, the constructive knowledge 
requirement in “knowing receipt” cases should be abandoned.51 
Second, it is abundantly clear from the Canadian and American cases 
that no proprietary link is necessary in order to justify restitutionary relief in 
three-party cases as a general matter. Many of these cases would involve 
situations where, if it were not for the intervention of the third party, the asset 
in question would have been acquired by the claimant. Thus, if Lawrence 
Moore had not breached his undertaking to Michelle, the insurance benefits 
would have been paid to her. As we have seen, the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that this was sufficient to establish that the benefit acquired by Risa 
 
50 See Moore, 409 D.L.R. 4th at 27, paras. 76–99. 
51 An alternative suggestion, achieving the same result, would be to reserve “knowing receipt” for 
truly fault-based liability involving receipt with knowledge of the misconduct and, at the same time, 
recognize a simple restitution claim for assets received which would be strict in nature. In this view, 
“knowing receipt” need not require continuing possession of the assets received and could, where 
applicable, give rise to a damages or account of profits claim. See Eloise Bant & Michael Bryan, 
Outflanking Barnes v Addy? The Persistence of Strict Recipient Liability, 11 J. EQUITY 271 (2017). 
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Sweet was acquired “at the expense of” Michelle Moore, and in the current 
Canadian jargon, at the “corresponding deprivation” of Michelle and thus 
provided the basis for an unjust enrichment claim. One might argue, perhaps, 
that in such circumstances funds transferred to Risa might be held in equity 
for Michelle and, accordingly, that an equitable proprietary link is 
established. At no point, however, did the Supreme Court suggest that 
Michelle was the owner of the funds acquired by Risa. The claim would not 
fail if the funds had been irretrievably mixed with the other funds by Risa. 
But even this analysis is not applicable to other cases in which meritorious 
claims have been allowed. Thus, in a typical tax reimbursement case, there is 
nothing to suggest that the taxing authority should have reimbursed the 
person who bore the burden of the tax. Nor is there any basis for suggesting 
that the funds paid to the recipient are owned by the person who has actually 
borne the burden of the tax. Nor do the courts granting recovery suggest that 
there is a proprietary link of this kind. Recovery is allowed simply because 
fairness requires that the monies be repaid to the person who initially bore 
the burden of the expense in question. In short, the Canadian and American 
cases offer some support for the proposition that a proprietary link between 
the claimant and the asset received by the defendant should not be considered 
to be an indispensable requirement in three-party cases. 
Third, American experience strongly suggests that the rule in Re 
Diplock ought to be generalized to deal with mistaken payments in a more 
general way. American jurisprudence allows recovery by an intended 
recipient more generally in circumstances where monies have been paid by 
mistake to the wrong party. To be sure, the typical mistake in American three-
party mistaken payment cases involves a “liability mistake.” That is, the 
payer mistakenly believes that he is liable to make the payment to the 
recipient. It therefore may be asked whether the rule should be extended to 
mistaken gratuitous transfers. Here, the Richardson Estate52 case may be of 
some assistance. At bottom, Richardson is a case where a party mistakenly 
makes a gift of insurance proceeds to one party in circumstances where they 
had intended to effectuate a transfer of those benefits to a new party. It 
appears to be the case in all three jurisdictions, that mistaken payments 
intended as a gratuitous transfer can be recovered by the mistaken payer.53 
There would appear to be no reason, in principle, why mistaken transfers in 
three-party cases should not similarly be subject to restitutionary relief in 
favour of the intended recipient of a mistaken gratuitous transfer. 
 
 
52 Roberts v. Martindale (1998), 162 D.L.R. 4th 475 (Can. B.C. C.A.). 
53 B.M.P. Global Distribution Inc. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 504, 506 (Can.); 
Barclays Bank Ltd. v. W.J. Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd. [1979] 3 All ER 522 at 523 (Eng.); 
RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 1, at § 45.  
